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Abstract  
This paper analyzes the possibility of a monopoly firm selling and renting a packaged software product. It 
employs a simple model to analyze the firm's pricing strategy. We observe that the introduction of the 
rental product leads to an increase in profits, an increase in selling and a decrease in rental prices as a 
function of the rate of change of the rental price with respect to the quantity sold.  
Introduction  
Renting of cars, apartments, and other durable economic goods is common today. Computer hardware can 
also be rented but the same is not true for software. Software products have the characteristic that their 
marginal cost of production is zero, i.e. it is very easy to copy software. This causes enormous problems in 
enforcing copyright laws for software. The Business Software Alliance and the Software Publisher's 
Association estimate losses from software piracy to be about $13 billion in 1995 [5]. This problem with 
IPR enforcement has affected the feasibility of renting software. However, software renting on a large scale 
has now become technically feasible. Microsoft's electronic distribution framework lets it implement new 
pricing and licensing paradigms including pay-per-view and software rental [2]. The Electronic Licensing 
and Security Initiative was formed in May 1996 [3] to build and operate a scaleable clearing house 
infrastructure that will make electronic distribution of software secure, accountable and quick.  
Short-term rental of durable economic goods is a common everyday occurrence. The economic benefits of 
leasing have been well researched and there are numerous articles, mostly in finance journals. It is argued 
in various articles that renting is equivalent to buying, using for a period of time and then selling the good 
and that there is no additional value created by allowing renting. However, a paper by Flath [4] advances 
several reasons why short-term renting offers economic advantages. He shows that leasing reduces 
transactions costs, including the cost of identifying, assuring, maintaining quality and the costs of search. A 
commonly cited example is that of automobile renting. The cost of searching and then determining the 
quality of an automobile is significant, the same is true of the transactions costs in a buy or sell transaction. 
Consumers who need an automobile for a short duration can reduce these costs by renting.  
We define microrenting as renting for a very short period of time. Typically, firms sell a license to use their 
software. This may be in the form of an end-user license or a site license. There are numerous restrictions 
on the sale and transfer of these licenses that reduce the viability of a used-software market [6]. The 
development of a rental market will fill the void caused by the absence of a used-software market. In recent 
years the development of the Internet and the World Wide Web has led to the development of electronic 
markets featuring dramatic reductions in transactions costs. This can aid a software rental market 
considerably, especially in view of the high costs of identifying and assuring the quality of used software 
products in a fast changing information world.  
Since the software company observes increasing returns to investment as she keeps investing in technology, 
the emergence of short-term natural monopolies is possible. One dominant strategy for the software 
companies seems to be to establish a customer base for her product and then make a lot of profit from 
selling upgrades. The passage of the Computer Software Rental Act in 1990 made it illegal to rent software 
without the copyright owner's specific permission. This legislation might also aid in the development of 
local monopolies in the software rental market.  
We develop a simple model of a monopoly selling and renting a software product. We show various 
reasons why it should be economically attractive for the monopoly to sell and rent the software 
simultaneously. We also offer some intuition on how prices would behave in such circumstances.  
Model  
We employ a simple monopoly model to analyze the gains from renting software.  
 
Figure 1: and as a function of the cross-elasticity parameter . is represented by the lighter 
colored curve. The parameter values are =20,  
Case 1: No Renting  
For a monopoly, given the market demand function  
 
where is the intercept and is the slope of the demand function, QS is the quantity demanded and PS is 
the selling price, the profit function is given by  
. 
We know from microeconomics textbooks [7] that the firm's optimal selling price is given by  
 
and the profit by  
. 
Case 2: Renting  
The monopoly firm produces a software product and either sells it or rents it. Since she faces two different 
demand functions, we represent the market with two demand functions. Information goods are 
characterized by having marginal cost of zero, hence the profit function only includes the total revenues.  
Let 1 be the software product sold, 2 be the product rented. We model the demand for 2 as a function of . 
The two demand functions, with representing selling and rental prices, quantity sold and 
rented respectively, are given by:  
 
where is the intercept of the demand functions, is the slope of the demand function for 1, is the 
slope of the demand function for 2 and is the cross-elasticity parameter of 2 with respect to 1.  
The profit function is given by  
.  
From the first order condition to the profit maximization problem, we get 
Optimal prices:  
 
 
And the optimal profit:  
. 
Results  
In this section, we compare the optimal solutions we have found above. We find that the profits in case 2 
are greater than in case 1 when  
 
which is always true.  
We also observe that the selling price is higher than the rental price if  
 
which implies that the demand intercepts and has to be large enough.  
Further, using comparative statics, we find that  
1. is increasing with respect to if >2 and .  
2. is decreasing with respect to if .  
Conclusion  
By introducing the rental software product, the monopolist increases her profits. In other words if the 
monopolist starts renting her software product, she will observe higher profits.  
An interesting result is that the monopolist's optimal selling price increases if the quantity demanded for 1 is 
more sensitive to changes in rental price than to changes in selling price.  
Future Directions for Research  
This paper attempts to develop a simplified model as a first step to address an interesting question. A more 
realistic model should capture properties of software products such as network externalities, and upgrades.  
A more complete model of software microrenting is developed by Choudhary et al. [1]. They examine a 
two period model of a monopoly selling and renting a software product that exhibits delayed network 
externalities.  
An extension of their model includes pre-emptive pricing by the monopolist which rents software. They 
also look at the behavior of the firms under the assumption of monopolistic competition.  
Another research direction that could be followed is to look at different market structures which can 
represent software market more realistically. One such market can be modeled as a duopoly and another as 
perfect competition.  
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